The liberal human rights tradition's center of gravity can be found in the arguments of the global community of human rights activists and international lawyers, who place a premium on the punishment of perpetrators and the vindication of victims in response to large scale crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other human rights
violations. On what justification? Their arguments usually presuppose the classic retributivist appeal to desert but typically stress even more strongly the value of punishment for bringing about the Rechtstaat -a political order based on the rule of law, human rights, and democracy. Their preferred institution is the trial and their signature accomplishment the international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and their subsequent institutionalization in the International Criminal Court. What they most strongly decry are amnesties, especially blanket amnesties like those that Latin American states yielded to former dictators in the 1980s and early 1990s. They commonly appeal for material reparations for victims. They do not necessarily oppose truth commissions, especially insofar as these reinforce accountability and reparations through exposing political crimes: "All that a truth commission can achieve is to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse," wrote Michael Ignatieff in an often quoted passage. 4 Indeed, since the days when commissions were typically accompanied by amnesties, as they were in Latin American and South Africa, human rights activists have come to recognize that truth commissions and trials need not be mutually exclusive, either in principle, or, as East Timor and Sierra Leone have proved, overriding goal of the liberal human rights tradition is to strengthen international institutions and regimes so as to achieve as much accountability for human rights violators and as much compensation for victims as possible -all over the world.
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The liberal human rights tradition's approach to past injustices is a close cousin of the "liberal peacebuilding consensus," an approach to the reconstruction of war-torn societies that entails not only lasting peace agreements but also human rights, democracy, and free markets, and economic progress and that has been adopted by the United Sociology 103, no. 1 (1997). or to combine complexly, two broad theories of punishment: retribution, which centers upon desert, and consequentialism, which stresses rehabilitation, deterrence, and the improvement of the social order.
Some of the most articulate transmittals of these commitments into the politics of transitional justice can be found in a volume of essays written mostly by political philosophers: Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, edited by Robert I.
Rotberg and Dennis Thompson. 9 Emerging from a conference in South Africa, the essays commonly reflect upon that country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, easily the most famous and most analyzed truth commission to date, whose prominent features include its offer of amnesty to human rights violators in the apartheid regime in return for their public confession, its dramatic and emotional public hearings, and the leadership of Commission Chairperson Archbishop Desmond Tutu --his charisma and his stress on forgiveness and on the healing of the nation and its citizens. Most strongly embodying a liberal human rights perspective on these proceedings are essays by Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Rajeev Bhargava, David A. Crocker, and Kent Greenawalt. To their writings might also be added the similarly grounded perspectives of Timothy Garton Ash, whose essays on South Africa and transitional justice elsewhere have appeared in The New York of Review of Books, and of Ignatieff, also a widely read essayist.
Though in some respects all of these writers laud the TRC, in three respects, which they articulate to different degrees, they criticize the TRC, and, by extension, those defenders of the TRC who stress religion and reconciliation. First, several of them express great reluctance towards abrogating punishment, viewing it as a regrettable sacrifice of justice to be pursued only if necessary to achieve some other good like a transition to democracy, not as a measure that reflects some higher or richer conception like restorative justice or reconciliation.
Second, they are skeptical that healing and forgiveness belong in politics. In part, they think that in politics these goods are likely to come to grief. When Ignatieff writes, " [a] ll that a truth commission can achieve . . .," he asserts the limits of truth commissions as much as he does their possibilities. 10 Crocker similarly criticizes Tutu's "ideal of social harmony" as "impractical" and "unrealistic." 11 But liberals' doubts about healing and forgiveness in politics run deeper than pragmatism. "Not only is Tutu's ideal of social harmony impractical," continues Crocker," but it is problematic because of the way it conceives the relation between the individual and the group." 12 Elsewhere he argues that "it is morally objectionable as well as impractical for a truth commission or any other governmental body to force people to agree about the past, forgive the sins committed against them, or love one another." 13 Here, liberal skepticism moves from pragmatic to moral. Political efforts to achieve healing, forgiveness, and harmony violate the autonomy of the individual in pursuing his or her own "conception of the good," to borrow the phrase of philosopher John Rawls. 14 They seek to define the good in areas where the pluralism of values ought to be respected. "As Isaiah Berlin has taught us," Third, most of these critics are leery of the role of religion in politics, espousing some version of Rawls' argument that political arguments ought to be expressed in secular, or "public," language. This, too, they regard as a democratic virtue. Naturally, it is the language of rights and law with which they are most at home.
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The contrast between the liberal human rights tradition and religious traditions, them also answer more ambitiously, redefining the very meaning of justice so as to encompass, but also exceed, human rights and just punishment. In the Jewish scriptures, the words that translate to the English "justice" -sedeqah and mishpat -also translate into righteousness, meaning comprehensive right relationship as revealed in God's covenants with humanity. 38 The same goes for the various Greek New Testament words for justice that begin with the dik-stem, including dikaiosunē, the word that St. Paul uses to denote his central concept of "justification." 39 The Arabic 'adl, the term that is most commonly translated into justice in the Qur'an, similarly means thoroughgoing right relationship. 40 Tutu in South Africa, restorative justice responds to past evil by seeking to restore relationships among perpetrators, victims, and community members with respect to the distinct ways in which violence has severed these relationships. In transitional settings, restorative justice includes human rights and possibly punishment, though it defends punishment differently than retributivism and consequentialism, but it also includes several other dimensions of restoration like apology, acknowledgment, reparations, and, the dimension of transitional justice that religious perspectives most distinctly advocate, forgiveness.
Forgiveness hovers close to the center of gravity of recent religious perspectives on transitional justice. It is their final distinctive feature. As with justice, these authors define forgiveness more ambitiously than most modern secular authors do. 43 Rather than an act that merely lets perpetrators "off the hook" for deserved crimes, forgiveness is a victim's own exercise of a will towards restoration, an act through which she herself may Recall, too, that the very religiosity of the religious evokes liberal skepticism.
Are religious advocates of reconciliation obligated to speak secular language in the public obligation, might there still be good reasons for them to develop and deploy secular arguments, say when they are dealing with an international organization or a secular nongovernmental organization, when they are operating in a pluralistic population, or when they are dealing with matters of constitutional law? Or do such "translations" only distort, compromise, and neuter their theological rationales? Again, religious commentators on transitional justice have much yet to tell us.
The Doers
In founding the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) in 1999, Douglas Johnston declared that he wanted to created a "do tank" and not another "think tank." Johnston himself is editor of two volumes of essays on the role of the religious in making peace, the first of which, 
The Way Ahead for the Religious Practice of Transitional Justice
What the literature on the religious practice of transitional justice, and more broadly, peacebuilding, has conveyed to the world is a treasure trove of approaches, episodes, stories, and analyses. Authors, editors, and, most of all, the practitioners that they write about have advanced an important and distinct realm of practice and inquiry.
Religion is no longer a missing dimension of statecraft. But if the challenge of theologians and other religious theorists in this area is to take a step towards practice, the challenge of the literature on praxis is now to take another step towards theory. To be sure, many of the works identify common characteristics and "lessons learned" from their visibility seems to depend on the personal communication and language skills of the individuals involved in terms of connecting with non-Muslim groups, organizations, academic institutions, and the media, their fund-raising skills and whether they are adopted or supported by non-Muslim, mostly Christian, groups. As many groups lack or do not have the time to develop these skills, it is difficult to identify Muslim peace-building actors without field research that includes interviews with various groups in those communities.
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The problem points to one of the areas where research can be most fruitful: identifying the range of religious actors -individuals, communities, organizations -who engage in peacebuilding, especially those who take a form that Westerners are not accustomed to.
Anthropologist Rosalind Shaw, for instance, studied the reception of Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the village level and found that national level processes often comported ill with local tribal traditions for addressing past injustices. regularized. Closer to a cascade is the norm that religious actors (and others) have urged upon truth commissions: reconciliation. Since South Africa followed Chile in making reconciliation the central theme of its truth commission, a wave of other states have followed suit: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Peru, Ghana, and others. Still, it is difficult to argue that reconciliation has become an ensconced norm in the "global polity" or the "normal" approach to which transitional countries default. Appleby divides religious approaches to his encompassing category of "conflict transformation" into different roles that religious peacebuilders play -conflict management, conflict resolution, and post conflict peacebuilding -as well as different modes that they assume, including "crisis mobilization" that often involves opposition to authoritarian regimes, a "saturation mode" in which religious peacebuilders flood a culture so as to transform it, and an "interventionist" mode that involves mediation and training. 69 The other work is Vinjamuri and Boesenecker's essay "Religious in But now that there exists a deposit of knowledge of a large array of efforts, it is high time that analysts began inquiring into the ingredients of success, drawing upon both positive and negative examples. Practitioners themselves will greatly benefit from the inquiry.
Of course defining success in itself is an analytical challenge, one that is highly dependent on goals, methodology, values, and the "theory of change" that is embedded in Religious "doers" of transitional justice and peacebuilding may well come to the defense of one of their favorite practices, forgiveness, and one of their favorite practitioners, Tutu. Brudholm's challenge, though, points to the need for a set of ethics that governs not only forgiveness, but the entire practice of transitional justice and peacebuilding from a religious perspective.
Conclusion
Advocates of religious approaches to transitional justice, both thinker and doers, role of forgiveness, responses to past injustices that bring multiple remedies to multiple wounds, and religious involvement in peacebuilding both within civil society and at the level of state institutions offer an approach to restoration that is arguably more holistic than, although in many ways compatible with, the approach of the liberal human rights tradition. It is this promise that has led prominent public figures like former United
States Ambassador to the United Nations John Danforth to call for the active integration of religion into the politics of peacebuilding.
Theologians can make reconciliation plausible for politics by developing it into practices and tackling ethical dilemmas. Theorists of practice will do well to address some of the analytical and ethical issues that lie beneath the worldwide buzz of religious peacebuilding. Both must answer arguments that the liberal human rights tradition has raised about the religious. If these efforts are successful, then, as Danforth envisions, religious and political leaders might regularly look to one another's abilities and resources as they seek to deal with the past and construct political futures. Whether welcome or not, though, the role of the religious in transitional justice cannot be avoided.
Neither the global trend of transitional justice nor the global rise of public religion is likely to peter out soon. Neither then, is the activity that stands at the intersection of these trends.
